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Abstract. Software agents that play a role in E-commerce and E-government
applications involving the Internet often contain information about the identity of their
human user such as credit cards and bank accounts. This paper discusses whether this
is necessary: whether human users and software agents are allowed to be anonymous
under the relevant legal regimes and whether an adequate interaction and balance
between law and anonymity can be realised from both the perspective of Computer
Systems and the perspective of Law.
1. Introduction
Practitioners in the field of AI and Law study how information and communication
technology can be used to support legal activities. Models and theories have been
devised and tested for diverse applications (e.g. Voermans, 1995). In this paper a
relatively new technology is studied: agent technology. Software agents’ adaptability,
mobility, intelligence and interactivity make them a versatile technological instrument.
This paper focuses on the role software agents can play in acquiring anonymity (of a
human user) on the Internet.
Anonymity plays a vital role in many activities of a legal nature. In preparing legal
advice it is essential that a legal practitioner can search anonymously on the Internet for
legal information. This may be information about statutory law or case law, but also e.g.,
information about the policies of a governmental body. The legal practitioner wants to be
able to gather this information without compromising his or her case by having the legal
body know in which information has (or has not) been reviewed in preparation of a
particular case. Anonymity is also relevant for the ordinary citizen. He or she may, e.g.,
want to express his or her views on governmental plans, policies and other issues of
public interest, without exposing his or her identity. Or he or she may want to report a
criminal offence to the authorities. In the Netherlands several hotlines for anonymously
reporting exist. The ‘Nationaal Platform Criminaliteitsbeheersing’ followed the ‘Meld
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Misdaad Anoniem’  initiative; from being a pilot, it has now become a structural facility
(http://www.meldmisdaad.nl/). The Business Software Alliance has had a telephone
number for reporting software copyright infringements for years. It is also possible to
report software piracy online (http://global.bsa.org/netherlands/report/report.php).
Software agents may possibly provide the means to guarantee the anonymity of the
person reporting the offence by electronic means.
This paper investigates the legal and technical considerations that play a role when
designing an anonymity preserving software agent. In analysing the legal requirements,
first the legal framework in which anonymity preserving software agents have to function
is discussed. In doing so we demonstrate that it is too simple to ask what ‘the’  legal
requirements are for ‘the’  anonymity preserving agent. Technology is not a datum to
which the law is applied. Instead there is a complicated interaction between technology
and law in which technology also influences the law. This point is illustrated by showing
that designing an anonymous software agent involves many multi-faceted design
decisions. Choices made during the design process may dramatically influence which
legal issues arise. This paper has been written from the perspective of Dutch Law to
illustrate the interaction between law and technology. The paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 addresses technical issues for identity and anonymity while section 3 addresses
legal issues for identity and anonymity. Technical and legal issues pertaining to the design
of law-abiding anonymous agents, are addressed in section 4. This paper ends with a
discussion in Section 5.
2. Technical Issues for Identity and Anonymity
This section defines the concepts of identity and anonymity and clarifies the role of
software agents in relation to these concepts. Techniques for establishing (relative or
absolute) anonymity are discussed and a number of applications for preserving anonymity
are presented.
2.1 Identity & Anonymity
The meaning of the term identity can be set off against ‘anonymity’ . Anonymity is
characterised by the fact that other parties do not know the other’ s identity. Froomkin
(Froomkin, 1995; 1996) distinguishes four types of anonymity and pseudoanonymity in
electronic communication: communication in which the sender’ s physical (or ‘real’ )
identity is at least partly hidden:
1. Traceable anonymity: the recipient does not have any clue as to the identity of the
sender. This information is in the hands of a single intermediary;
2. Untraceable anonymity: the sender of an electronic message is not identifiable at all;
3. Untraceable pseudonymity: the pseudonym used be the sender of an electronic
message is not identifiable. This is similar to untraceable anonymity, however, the
sender uses a pseudonym. A pseudonym differs from an anonymous denotation in
that pseudonyms can be used to build up an image and a reputation just like any
other online personality. Therefore, pseudonyms are used consistently over a certain
period of time, while an anonymous denotation might be used only once, for a single
message;
4. Traceable pseudonymity: the pseudonym of the sender can be traced back to the
sender although not necessarily by the recipient. Within the category of traceable
pseudonyms, a distinction can be made between pseudonyms that have been assigned
‘formally’  to somebody by a ‘third party’  or pseudonyms that have been chosen by
the holder of the pseudonym himself or herself.
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Apart from these four types of communication where the sender’ s identity is hidden in
some way, there is the situation in which the sender uses his/her ‘real’  identity: there is
no anonymity or pseudonymity.
2.2 Anonymity & Agents
The subjects of identity and anonymity play a double role for agents: agents themselves
have an identity, and an agent may act on behalf of one or more humans. In the second
role an agent may carry confidential information which can be used to identify one or
more humans. Also the behaviour of a software agent can shed light on the identity of a
human, e.g., if an agent is seen to often visit one specific IP-address, this may give away
the human on whose behalf the agent is performing a task. Examples of confidential
information include personal information and identification information such as banking
information, credit cards, money, information about its organisation, information about
its owner, logins and passwords, and information about its user, including the identity of
the user or owner. Legal duties may require safeguarding of any confidential information
from unwanted disclosure and traceability, including information which may identify
humans. The identity of agents is commonly used for communication purposes and is
usually made public in through directory services (cf. yellow pages).
Agent platforms host agents, i.e. they offer environments in which agents run,
supporting services such as communication and mobility. A number of agent platforms
currently exist, including FIPA-OS (FIPA, 2001), OAA (Martin, Cheyer and Moran,
1999), Jade (Bellifemine, Poggi and Rimassa, 2001), ZEUS (Nwana, Ndumu, Lyndon
and Collis, 1999), and AgentScape (Wijngaards, Overeinder, Steen and Brazier, 2002).
In the rule these platforms assure that confidential information in an agent is only to
be disclosed to other agents and agent platforms in specific situations and under given
conditions. Other agents may, however, fool an agent into revealing confidential
information. Agent platforms may also be able to fully inspect an agent’ s code and data.
Confidential information thus needs to be protected from untrusted agent platforms and
other agents.
2.3 Technical measures
Protecting confidential information not only depends on techniques but also on protocols
and standards. Techniques make it possible for a software agent to protect itself and its
data content against ill willing subjects. Below is a brief description of common
techniques and protocols for information protection (Anderson, 2001; Tanenbaum and
Steen, 2002):
• Cryptography is based on the principle that information can be encrypted with a key
which results in unintelligible information, which in turn can be restored to its original
form when it is decrypted with the same key (symmetric cryptosystem).
• Public key infrastructures are based on the principle that a unique pair of encryption
and decryption keys is employed (asymmetric cryptosystem). The effect is that
information encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted via the private key,
and vice versa. Commonly, a certification authority is used to assert that a specific
public key is owned by a specific entity.
• Digital signatures are based on the principle that on the basis of information, a unique
number can be computed by an irreversible mathematical function (a hash-function)
and is usually signed (i.e., encrypted) by the owner of the information. Commonly,
digital signatures are employed to verify the integrity of the information (Brazier,
Oskamp, Prins, Schellekens and Wijngaards, 2004): the receiver can also compute
the unique number, and compare this with the received number in the decrypted
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signature (e.g. using PKI).
• Split keys are based on the principle that an agent is given part of a private key, while
the other part remains, e.g., with the user. To use the private key, the agent needs to
obtain the other part of the private key, e.g., from its user or a trusted third party.
• Cloaking and watermarking are based on the principle of steganography, i.e. hiding
information in cover-information: an agent may hide its private keys in, e.g., its code.
• Certificates are based on the principle that a trusted third party can provide digitally
signed information, e.g., for permissions and electronic money (Sherif, 2000).
An important issue related to these techniques concerns distributing keys: how to know
which key belongs to which entity? Approaches are being developed involving both
trusted public systems (centralised) or webs of trust (decentralised), e.g., to verify an
agent’s identity.
A software agent is clearly dependent upon its environment: on other software agents
and the agent platform on which it runs, but also on services both from trusted and
untrusted third parties (e.g. certificate authorities or directory services).
Confidential information and agent identities play a role in the following situations:
• Mobility: software agents may migrate to locations, some of which may be malicious
or non reliable for other reasons. Confidential information in mobile agents has
always a risk of being disclosed unless encrypted.
• Cloning: software agents may be cloned, i.e. a copy is made which is completely the
same as the original (including confidential information). It is debatable whether a
clone has the same identity as the original; in some definitions of cloning the clone is
always the same as the original, to the extent that one can give information to the
clone and obtain it from the original: they’re indistinguishable (note that some agent
platforms may not support multiple agents with the same identity). In other cases,
when the clone of an agent "runs its own life", a different identity is assigned. It must
be remarked that cloning is a recent technology that still has to come fruition.
• Aggregation: software agents which are grouped together may also have a collective
identity. Examples include all agents of one user or agents that currently work on a
shared problem. A collective identity may be used for communication purposes, but
also for acting. In the latter case, usually a specific agent assumes the collective
identity and is able to act. Just like cloning, aggregation is not yet a fully developed
and ripened technology.
Protecting confidential information also depends on protocols, which may specify when
confidential information is revealed, to whom, how it is to be used, and what is to be
logged. However, an agent needs to implicitly trust the agent platform on which it runs:
a computer has complete control over the agents it hosts, but not necessarily all
information contained in agents. Although tracing techniques may be used to detect
whether an agent platform disobeys protocols, damages may still occur. This also applies
to other agents, whether they act according to protocol, and whether tracing can be
useful for detection and prevention. Traceability or logging of actions is commonly part
of both agent protocols and technical protocols, often distributed among multiple agent
platforms in different legal domains. Determining the granularity of the actions logged,
the reliability of tracing data, and storing and processing such tracing data is not easily
accomplished.
Agent platforms use access control policies to decide which agents to host. Such
access control policies may favour agents which identify themselves and their human
designer, human owner, and/or human user. This may conflict with the needs of human
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users, who may wish to remain anonymous at all times.
Based on the current technological situation, options are to
• place only minimal confidential information in a software agent,
• use appropriate techniques to hide confidential information,
• use appropriate protocols when interacting with other agents and agent platforms,
• implement appropriate protective strategies in a software agent,
• reflect on the consequences of confidential information becoming (semi-)public,
• use appropriate access control policies provided by agent platforms.
Further research is needed to determine what ’appropriate’ entails and how it can be
obtained. To this end protocols and techniques need to be analysed and tested to verify
their robustness and reliability in terms of computational expense, temporality, and
legality.
It should be noted that encryption and other techniques only provide temporary
confidentiality: in the (near) future, new technologies may make it possible to decrypt
previously confidential information. Although adjusting the ’key length’ may provide
some protection against new technologies, advances in mathematics and quantum
computing may invalidate techniques and protocols entirely.
Possible approaches to avoid using a software agent with confidential information:
• send agents without any confidential information to report back with information
upon which the user can take action, e.g., an agent searches for a book in a
bookstore, while the human user buys the book.
• use (e.g.) electronic cash which gives legitimacy to a specific action to be undertaken
by an agent and which does not require information about a human, e.g., an agent
searches for, and buys, a digital book and brings it to the human user.
2.4 Anonymity facilitation
The above shows that anonymisation is technically complex. Most users of
anonymisation technology do not build their anonymisation software themselves. They
rely on third parties who supply them with the software and in certain cases on third
parties who provide services. These third parties can then be said to facilitate
anonymisation. Current services facilitating anonymity and pseudonymity that have been
designed for human users are services for anonymous email and surfing. Below, a
number of these services are listed:
• anon.penet.fi was a centralised double blind remailing service until ca. 1996, when it
was legally forced to disclose identities of users, after which it was shut down
(Martin, 1998).
• www.anonymizer.com offers centralised anonymous surfing, but may disclose
information about users during their surfing session or afterwards on the basis of logs
(Martin, 1998).
• rewebber.com (formerly JANUS), also offer centralised anonymous surfing, but is
designed for anonymous publishing (Martin, 1998; Rieke and Demuth, 2001).
• www.onion-router.net; onion routing is a decentralised approach (based on mixing,
used by, e.g., MixMaster), in which a message is transmitted over a number of
intermediate nodes, each of which have their own PKI-pairs. The ’onions’ are the
layered encrypted messages; the ’onion routers’ are the forwarding nodes. The last
node is able to unpack the message, and send it to its destination. Onion routing
obfuscates message content, message origin and destination, and its implementation
impedes traffic analysis (Martin, 1998; Goldschlag, Reed and Syverson, 1999).
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• Crowds is an alternative to onion routing, more akin to a peer-to-peer approach, in
which each participant is a node (Martin, 1998; Reiter and Rubin, 1998;1999).
Messages are not wrapped in encrypted layers, but encrypted once.
• lpwa.com, the Lucent personal web assistant (a.k.a. ProxyMate), offered pseudonym
services, via which users can easily obtain user names, passwords, and email
addresses to be used to access websites which require user registration (Gabber,
Gibbons, Matias and Mayer, 1997). Lucent has sold this technology to NaviPath.
• www.zeroknowledge.com: Zero Knowledge Systems is an example of a company
offering software to enhance privacy (i.e., provide forms of anonymity and
pseudonymity).
For humans, two of the most commonly used anonymity services are Internet cafés and
throwaway web-based email addresses.
3. Legal Issues for Identity and Anonymity
3.1 Legal obligations to reveal ones identity
Legal obligations to identify oneself in online environments are relatively scarce. In the
real world this obligation differs from country to country. The Dutch Identification Duty
Act imposes a passive identification obligation in certain situations, such as fare dodging
or visiting a soccer match. In June 2004, an Act received royal assent that widened the
existing identification duties. According to this Act, every person over the age of
fourteen is obliged to show his or her ‘means of identification’  at first request to a police
officer in any situation ( Wet van 24 juni 2004 tot wijziging en aanvulling van de Wet op
de identificatieplicht, het Wetboek van Strafrecht, de Algemene wet bestuursrecht, de
Politiewet 1993 en enige andere wetten in verband met de invoering van een
identificatieplicht van burgers ten opzichte van ambtenaren van politie aangesteld voor de
uitvoering van de politietaak en van toezichthouders (Wet op de uitgebreide
identificatieplicht), Stb. 2004, 300). The Act requires identification by means of one of
the prescribed means of identification, such as a passport. For the time being, the
prescribed means of identification do not lend themselves for online use. The Act is thus
only of theoretical value for online situations.
With respect to the use of software agents, the obligations to identify oneself
formulated in the directive on electronic commerce and the distance-selling directive are
especially relevant. The user of a software agent acting as (1) a provider of services of
the information society, (2) as a person involved in commercial communication, or (3) as
a person supplying goods at a distance (as defined in the latter directive), has to make his
or her identity actively known. The user of a software agent must adhere to the following
obligations with respect to self-identification:
• The active identification obligation of art. 5 Directive 2000/31/EC requires of the
service provider that identification information is easily, directly and permanently
accessible; a website is an adequate means to make the information ‘permanently’
known. A single e-mail message to a software agent's human counterpart may not
meet this requirement: it may not be available directly and if it is not stored it may be
too transitory in nature.
• The active identification obligation of art. 6 Directive 2000/31/EC requires of the
sender of commercial communication, also known as spam, that identification
information is clearly indicated or referred to in the (spam)message; this requirement
does not seem to be problematic with respect to agents, even if the (spam)message is
delivered to a software agent's human counterpart.
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• Dutch National legislation requires certain contracts to be in writing. Online, this
form requirement may be met by using an electronic equivalent to a traditional
writing (art. 9 Directive 2000/31/EC). According to the Dutch Implementation Act,
the electronic equivalent of a writing must be such that the identity of the contracting
parties is determinable to a sufficient degree. This means that a software agent used
to close contracts must be able to reliably pass on the identity of its user (i.e. one of
the contracting parties), so that this can be ‘incorporated’  in the contract. This may
mean that the agent must be able to use the electronic signature of its user.
• Identification on the basis of Directive 97/7/EC (on distance selling): the supplier
must make identification data available to the consumer in writing or in another
durable medium available and accessible to the consumer. This means that delivery to
a consumer's mobile agent is not enough. After all, an agent may – if it is mobile –
not be accessible at all times by its user. Furthermore, it seems difficult to guarantee
storage on a durable medium.
3.2 Anonymity
Sometimes a person wants to hide his or her identity or participate under a pseudonym in
social life (Grijpink and Prins, 2001). A legal practitioner may want to collect data
without other parties knowing what kind of information he or she is actually seeking. A
person may thereto make use of a software agent that hides his or her ‘true’  identity.
Seeking anonymity
Legally, the status of anonymity is rather subtle (See Nicoll and Prins 2003). On the one
hand, a right to anonymity does not exist. On the other hand, a person is not prohibited
to try and find anonymity with the help of organisational, technical or contractual means.
The use of a software agent hiding the identity of its user while acting on the Internet is
therefore basically allowed.
This also holds for contracting. The key principle of the Dutch contract law is that
contracts can, in principle, be entered into without prescribed form: 'unless stipulated to
the contrary, declarations, including notifications, can be given in any form and can be
incorporated in behaviour', reads Article 3:37, paragraph 1, of the Dutch Civil Code
(Grijpink and Prins 2003, p. 256). The principle that the parties themselves determine the
method used to declare their intent implies that they can declare their intent also in an
absolutely anonymous way. This makes absolutely anonymous electronic legal
transactions possible. Thus, it also allows for the use of agents that do not reveal the
identity of its user.
Anonymity is, however, limited in that a person cannot deny identification duties that
rest upon him. The mere existence of an identification duty does of course not imply a
lack of anonymity. The anonymity is only lifted by observance to the identification duty.
Someone wishing to protect his or her anonymity may, therefore, want to evade
situations in which such a duty must be fulfilled.
Identifying an anonymous person
As noted above, a person may seek anonymity using the means he or she sees fit. The
reverse, however, may also hold: other people may try to find out the identity of
someone who is anonymous. Someone trying to unveil the identity of an anonymous
person must observe the law in doing so: he or she may, e.g., not infringe upon the
privacy of the anonymous person, he or she is not allowed to hack into computers or
wiretap telecommunications. From these examples it appears that a number of legal rules
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exist that can be helpful in protecting one's anonymity, although ‘anonymity’  is not the
prime object that is protected by the rules. One could say that those rules provide
‘flanking’  protection to anonymity. Any acts aimed at finding out a person’ s identity that
are not unlawful, may thus be used. One may, e.g., ask a third person to disclose the
identity of an anonymous person. In general, the third person is of course under no duty
to disclose the identity. In special circumstances an obligation to identify may exist. In
this respect the recent discussion about the conditions under which an ISP must make the
identity of a subscriber known can be mentioned (See: A. Sims, 2003, A. Ekker 2003
and W.A.M. Steenbruggen 2002). In literature, it has been advocated that the interests
favouring divulgement of the identity and the rights and interests that oppose
divulgement must be determined. Subsequently the proportionality and the subsidiarity of
the divulgement must be judged (W.A.M. Steenbruggen 2002).
Facilitating Anonymity
Is it illegal to provide anonymity software or anonymizing services? As a general rule, a
person supplying means, facilities or services to another is basically not liable for the use
another makes of the means, facilities or services. Outside the field of identity and
anonymity, there are a few clear exceptions to this rule; provision of means to
circumvent technical measures to protect copyrighted software has, e.g., been
criminalised (See art. 32a Dutch Copyright Act and art. 7.1.c Software Directive). With
respect to the facilitation of anonymity such a clear exception does not exist. In principle
it is thus not illegal to help someone to remain anonymous. But there is a general
limitation. The freedom to supply means etc. that are susceptible to misuse is not
unconstrained. If the supplier of the products or services knows that the receiver of the
products or services will use them for criminal activities he or she may not supply them.
If he or she does, he or she runs the risk of being termed the accomplice to the offence
the receiver commits. So a software engineer who knows that the receiver of his
anonymizing software plans to use it for, e.g., fraudulous purposes must not supply it. In
criminal law there is ‘knowledge’  even if the supplier merely accepts the not as imaginary
discardable chance that the receiver will use the software for criminal purposes. Such
acceptance will only be present if the supplier has concrete indications that such is to
happen. The mere provision of software that – theoretically - could be misused does not
make him an accessory or accomplice.
Third party access to identifying data
Those who facilitate anonymity often have data on their systems that could help third
parties – such as the police - identify those who seek anonymity. This triggers a whole
new set of issues that have legal implications. The nature of the function of the server
entails that the systems containing personal information must be secured against
unauthorised access. Without such security it will probably be impossible to convince
prospective users to use the technology. Apart from this, there is also a legal duty to take
reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality of the information if the software
agents contain personal data and the manager of a system can be qualified as a
‘controller’  or ‘processor’  of these data as defined in Directive 95/46/EC.
Perhaps more interesting than the unauthorised access is the question of authorised
access and issues related to that. What rights do the police have to access data that are
transported, stored or processed in the system? What are the obligations of the manager
of the system that correspond to the police’ s rights?
Certain obligations rest on providers of public telecommunication networks and
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services. Telecommunication services are broadly defined as all services that consist
completely or partly in the transmission or routing of signals across a
telecommunications network. The services of an anonymizing server are covered by this
definition. It may only be that the manager does not provide a public service (which is
rather tautologically defined as a service that is available to the public) . This could be
the case if the service were to be offered in a closed network. But in other cases, it seems
that our manager has to comply with the Telecommunications Act. So, what obligations
has the Telecommunications Act in store for our manager?
• According to art. 13.1 Dutch Telecommunications Act a provider of a public
telecommunications network or service must make it possible to wiretap their
network or service. This means that the technical arrangements to wiretap must be in
place.
• According to art. 13.2 Telecommunications Act a provider must cooperate with the
police or the secret service if the competent authorities have authorised them to
‘wiretap’  or acquire traffic data.
• According to art. 13.4 Telecommunications Act a provider must supply the police or
the secret service with certain administrative data concerning a user, if they need
these data to apply with the competent authorities for a mandate to wiretap or
acquire traffic data. In certain special cases a provider must retain data about a user
for a period of three months.
• If a provider has cooperated with the police and possibly has given the police data
with respect to a subscriber the provider must keep confidential his cooperation and
the information he or she got through it about the subscriber. The provider may
especially not inform the subscriber about the interest the police has shown.
• Apart from these obligations the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure has some
additional obligations. The most important seems to be the obligation to decipher
data that are encrypted; anyone who can reasonably be assumed to ‘know’ , the key
for deciphering can be ordered to decipher (with a few exceptions for those that have
a duty of non-disclosure, such as doctors etc.).
3.3 Software agents and anonymity
In the foregoing, anonymity has been described, the question whether it is legal has been
addressed as has the question how anonymity by software agents can technically be
achieved. An outstanding question is however why it is at all desirable that people can
act anonymously. What stance do we take with respect to anonymity?
By acting anonymously an actor withholds information from others, such as
(potential) contract partners, readers of posted messages, senders of newsletters etc. It is
unknown to them who is acting. Bentham once coined the famous catch phrase that
‘knowledge is power’  (Bentham, 1791). If this principle is applied to the situation at
hand this means that anonymity shifts power from others to the person acting
anonymously. Assuming that anonymity gives power to the person acting anonymously,
why would such a state of affairs be desirable? At this time in which threats of terrorism
abound and anonymity almost immediately is suspect. It is all too easy to imagine for
what detrimental purposes ‘power by anonymity’  could be used.
On the other hand, current technology driven developments increase transparency of
persons. Whoever enters the Internet releases information about him or herself. Often
more than is apparent to the average Internet user. Many of the examples are well-
known. When visiting websites, cookies are left on ones hard disk for the website-
software to inspect when visiting the website anew. Browsing through websites may
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mean that the website owner records a click-trail. The number of websites no longer
open to the public without any formality is. Registration is an access-condition that
becomes ever more pervasive. Buyers at online auctions must identify themselves, even if
this is to the detriment of their bargaining position. Of course, one could object that laws
about informational privacy guard against over-processing of our personal data.
Each processing of personal data in Europe must comply with the standards set in
directive 95/46/EC. When personal data ‘pass’  the European border, adequate safe-
harbour guarantees must be in place. But the reality is that in view of the technical
possibilities the data subject is losing out. Transparency about where ones personal data
are stored and processed is lacking. The grounds for processing personal data (see art. 8
WBP) allow for the processing of personal data in a wide variety of situations, i.e. a
necessary concession to the fact that personal data are often a necessity for the
performance of, or at least a very welcome lubricant of, all kinds of societal processes.
Why is it then that the laws of informational privacy appear so inadequate? Is that
because they are set up in an inadequate way? This is not necessarily the case. Under
these laws a reality has developed in which the initiative lies almost exclusively with the
processors of personal data. This ‘factual’  situation makes that processors of personal
data are in a much better position to ‘play their cards’  under the prevailing privacy
regulations.
If one considers the situation that has developed to be undesired what then should be
the answer? One could consider the modification of privacy laws. It does, however, seem
that not much is to be expected from a change in legislation. It is not so much the
legislation that is the problem, but the way in which the parties involved are able to
materialise their goals and desires under the legislation. To bring about a change in this
situation by changing the law would probably lead to legislation that ties everyone down.
That cannot be the solution.
A solution should in our view be found much more in bringing back the initiative to
the data subject. As long as the data subject has to hand over his or her personal data and
must trust that the receiver processes his or her data with reticence the data subject will
always be in the arrears. So it is only if the data subject can keep data to himself or
herself that he or she returns to a situation in which he or she can retake control over his
or her personal data. This is where anonymity and pseudonymity enter the equation.
Anonymity and pseudonymity can no longer be considered a toy for privacy-forerunners.
It is not a luxury anymore; it is almost becoming something of a necessity, a basic toll for
whoever enters the Internet.
In the previous section we saw that the law leaves in principle enough room to act
anonymously, although no right to anonymity exists or is likely to emerge in the
foreseeable future. We also saw that software agents can easily be combined with
technologies that preserve an agent owner’ s anonymity to various degrees.
We must however warn that the legal and technical domains are not the only ones that
are to be considered when deploying anonymity preserving software agents. There is also
something like market acceptance to be considered. It is e.g. no use being anonymous if
you cannot do anything. If a prospective contracting partner does not want to contract
with an anonymous person, anonymity preserving technology is to no avail for this
purpose. Will such a hostile attitude towards anonymity become the rule? Such a
negative stance need however not be taken. The attitudes towards anonymity are to
some extent ‘makeable’ . If anonymising software agents are around and start being used
a period of habituation can commence. Without anonymisation technology being
available, habituation to the other alternative, i.e., identifiability, may grow.
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What does the foregoing mean for anonymity preserving software agents? The
development of software agents should be guided by the principles of transparency and
choice.
The principle of choice means that users of software agents must have the possibility
to use anonymity preserving agents if they so desire. This means that these software
agents must be available on the marketplace. The law should not prescribe what
anonymity preserving features software agents should have, nor how anonymity
preservation is technically realised. It is up to the market to decide upon these issues.
The market would ideally develop many different types of anonymity preserving software
agents. It is up to a user to select specific agents that fit his or her needs and desires.
The second principle, the principle of transparency, means that developers of software
agents should explain to users the anonymising capabilities of their software agents.
Some technologies are more expensive to implement and use. E.g. technologies that
make it more difficult to analyse the traffic of software agents may be useful, but slower
and potentially cumbersome. It cannot be assumed that the technically better
anonymising technology is also the technology that will be adopted by the marketplace.
There is most likely not one technology that provides the answer to all needs. The user
should however be able to make an informed choice.
A second aspect of transparency is the transparency after the fact. If a breach of
anonymity has occurred a software agent should be able to report its user about the
breach. This gives the user the possibility to take measures that limit the damage that
might occur as a result of the breach, and it also enables a user to judge the capabilities
of anonymisation technology. Thus a user can make a better-informed choice the next
time he is to use a software agent for anonimising purposes.
In conclusion, one can say that anonymity is a means needed to restore the balance in
the way personal data are dealt with on the Internet. Software agents have an important
part to play in the provision of anonymity on the Internet. Nonetheless, setting up a
system for anonymity preserving software agents is no sine cure. By way of example, the
next section shows some of the intricacies one has to deal with when designing these
software agents.
4. Law abiding anonymous agents
Although anonymity and pseudonymity raise many interesting issues, this section focuses
on one hypothetical design issue. This hypothetical example illustrates the intricate ways
in which technical and legal considerations interact. This section first describes the design
choice and then shows its relevance for computer scientists and lawyers.
4.1 A design choice
Given the legal starting point that providing the means for anonymity is in itself not
prohibited, software engineers can decide to build an anonymity preserving software
agent and the necessary infrastructure. The conclusion of section 3.3. is that it is
desirable that anonymity preserving software agents are developed. This section focuses
on the following design decision: software engineers may at one point or another be
faced with the issue of where to have anonymization take place.
As stated above anonymization is technically not just a matter of removing all
information from a software agent that could give clues about the identity of the user of
the software agent. An individual or an organisation trying to trace the identity of the
user could also try to analyse how the software agent travels across the Internet. It is
clear that traffic analysis could shed light as to who the user of the software agent is: if
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the software agent often returns to the same IP-address it seems to be a safe bet to
assume that this is the address of its user.
To counter the risk that traffic analysis shows who the user of the software agent is,
the anonymity infrastructure could be extended to include an additional server purely for
the purpose of anonymization. The function of the server is to complicate and ideally
frustrate any attempt to perform traffic analysis. The server could, e.g., work in the
following way: it transforms (the bits making up) an incoming software agent and its
technical identity in such a way that an outside observer has a hard time relating a
software agent that leaves the server to a software agent that entered it at some earlier
time. This can, of course, only work if the volume of incoming and outgoing traffic is
sufficiently large. For the platform that hosts the software agent in the end, it would
seem as if it came from the anonymizing server; making it impossible to see where the
software agent has been before. Alternatively, a simpler approach without a server could
be chosen. If an anonymizing software agent changes its (software agent) identity and
works from varying IP-addresses and does not ‘go home’  to its user too often,
traceability can also be counteracted. Other alternatives without a server are the
following:
• to use an agent only once; a new agent is generated for each new job (while re-using
experiences from old agents), e.g. by using a big personal agent that sends out small
helper agents, which are killed when they've finished their job,
• to re-use agent identities or the agents themselves,
• to make use of a 'rent-an-agent' principle: very useful agents exist, and can be
rented/hired to perform a task for you. The agent can be traced, but, by using secure
communications, the client cannot be (easily) traced. Furthermore, observers cannot
easily distinguish the current, temporary, user. Needless to say, that the user needs to
trust the company providing the agent for hire.
• to employ agents from other users / owners to do your jobs: you are not traceable,
but they are.
4.2 Technical considerations
A system designer has at least two alternatives in this situation: he or she can create an
infrastructure with an additional server with the prime purpose of erasing an agent’ s
tracks, or one without. This is the design choice that is leading in the rest of this paper.
There are of course many additional technical considerations that could play a role (e.g.
commercial or organisational consideration), but these are not given any further attention
in the context of this example. Considerations for an anonymity infrastructure without an
additional server could be:
• It is less complicated and therefore easier to program, easier to make robust etc.
• The absence of the server makes for faster traffic. The necessary time that a software
agent is inside the server in the other option is not needed.
• There are advantages in scalability. Since all functionality is performed in a
distributed way, the software can function well with both small and large volumes.
The alternative with the server seems to be rather critical on volumes: too little traffic
and it is easy to relate outgoing agents to incoming ones, too much traffic and the
server becomes a bottleneck.
As considerations for an anonymity infrastructure with a server, the following can be
mentioned:
• The server makes it much harder (and ideally impossible) to trace a user by way of a
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traffic analysis: although the agent is known to be affiliated with this server, its real
user / owner remains unknown.
• Updates of the software are easier to perform; the number of servers is limited and
they can function as a base to perform the updates of the software agents that pass
through them.
4.3 Relevance of legal considerations
Clarity about the legal implications is a necessary precondition for making ‘technical’
design decisions. A short legal analysis shows that legal aspects have a bearing on the
following aspects that a system designer would need to take into account when designing
a system:
• The effectiveness of the software (agent): the effectiveness of protection of the
anonymity using an additional server, may in part be lost the judicial rights to
authorised access are frequently exercised.
• The law may require certain extra functionality to be included, e.g., to choose for the
alternative with the additional server may imply the need to be able to tap the wire.
The system manager is assigned a specific role in his or her interaction with the
authorities.
Legal analysis contributes to insight in the requirements imposed on a system. Legal
considerations include:
• What duties rest on the actors in light of diverging design decisions? What duties to
inform and to warn rest, e.g., on the providers of information technology? How can
these duties be fulfilled?
• What legal infrastructure is needed in the different scenarios? If a trusted third party
(TTP) is needed what clauses must be in the contract the TTP closes with third
parties?
• What issues of public interest are raised when choosing one alternative or the other?
If this hypothetical design choice were to have been made in reality, what choice would
have been made? Although a choice would depend upon many circumstances of the field
of application, it seems that simplicity would point in the direction of a system without a
server. Both technically and legally, many complications can be avoided by choosing the
simpler approach. Furthermore, for many legal applications of anonimizing software
agents trust plays a vital role: the existence of a server that plays a central role in the
actual anonymization could have a detrimental effect on the perception of
trustworthiness given the possibilities of authorised access by the police. Imagine that the
police would seek access to the logfiles of such a central server for finding out who
reported a certain crime. The trust of the public in the ‘hotline’  would collapse
immediately.
On the other hand, however, legislation may be imposed which requires the use of
servers. A trade-off is required between the level of anonymity needed and the
desireability to remove the anonymity of perpetrators.
5. Discussion
Anonymity is of increasing importance for shielding one's personal information when
going online. Section 3.3 indicated that anonymity may even become a necessary tool to
preserve a human’ s informational privacy. Software agents can technically facilitate
anonymity although there is not one self-evident way to design anonymity preserving
software agents. Many alternative designs are possible.
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Highlighting a number of options for a specific design choice demonstrated how
technical and legal issues are closely interwoven. Developers of technology are free to
choose alternatives that suit certain parties (e.g. users and providers) and make life
difficult for others (e.g. the police). To increase insight in these mechanisms at an early
stage, it is not only necessary that lawyers are involved in the development of
technology, but also that there is discussion on how the co-operation between lawyers
and technicians should take place. Difficult issues seem to be the following:
• How can legal aspects e.g. with respect to anonymity be contemplated in an early
stage of technical development? Who is to determine what design choices are
desirable and undesirable from a legal perspective? How ‘weighty’  should legal
considerations be in the entirety of considerations that govern design choices?
• Are design decisions e.g. regarding anonymity made sufficiently explicit during
software development? How can legally relevant aspects of design decisions be
discovered and identified.
• How to structure the field once relevant design options and a multitude of legal
aspects have been identified?
One way to handle the latter could be to identify a number of exemplary scenarios with
interrelated design decisions for further study. Once the technical and legal merits of
different aspects have been identified possibly more can be said about more general
guidelines.
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